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From the model of Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001), we modelize a technological shock with 
uncertainty. We assume that this technological shock appears in the shape of new firms. Only 
a part of these firms will be productive.  Uncertainty relates to the identification of the viable 
firms. This uncertainty decreases with the time and the diffusion of fundamentalist 
information that makes it possible to identify without error the viable firms.  Without this 
fundamentalist information, the behavior of agents follows a rule of decision similar to that 
formulated by Heiner (1983).  Uncertainty concerning the identification of viable firms which 
emerge of the technological shock, leads to a stock market bubble even though agents have a 
perfect knowledge of the impact of the shock and date on which it occurs.  This type of 
uncertainty seems to characterize firms of the Information Communication Technology 
industries, which are confronted with a "winners take all" competition.   
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1. Introduction 
 
  For a few years, literature on stock market models with major technological change has 
expand (e.g., Greenwood and Yarukoglu, 1997; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1999; Hobijn and 
Jovanovic, 2000; Manuelli, 2000), but asset price bubbles are never mentioned in these 
studies. However, financial history reveals that innovation and stock market bubbles are very 
close phenomena (Kindleberger, 1989; Chancellor, 1999): the Tulip Mania in the 1630’s; the 
Railway Mania of 1845, the bull markets of the 1920s with speculation on radio, electricity, 
aviation, motor vehicle firms. 
  More recently, the development of Information Communication Technology (ICT) 
industries has been accompanied by a spectacular bubble over all of technological stock 
market on the world (tables 1 and 2). 
  ICT industries are characterized by increasing returns and network effects. Both of these 
factors give ICT industries a “winners take all” nature. First, firms in ICT industries tend to 
have fixed costs and low marginal costs. Fixed costs and sunk costs are a large part of factor 
payments because these firms invest in a physical or virtual network to create and deliver the 
product, and they must make substantial investments in research and development. Once the 
firms make the initial investment, it is cheap to product an additional unit (Evans and 
Schmalensee, 2001). This structure of production costs can be seen in industries such as 
microprocessors, computer softwares or services delivered by mobile telephony firms. That is, 
production in ICT industries exhibits increasing returns. 
Second, many ICT industries (e.g., telephone network, internet site, computer software) 
have network effects. Network industries are characterized by the fact that the more 
consumers who use the product the more valuable it becomes (Shapiro and Varian, 1998). 
Networks effects are a source of scale economies and thus tend to produce markets with at 
most a small number of producers (Noe and Parker, 2000). Thus, for the ICT industries firms, 
the fundamental strategic stake becomes the conquest of the dominant position on its market. 
The particular structure of the production function of these companies which obeys increasing 
returns and which implies a competition of the type “winners take all” ensures the leader of 
high potential profits.  The difficulty for investors is then to determine at the stage where all 
the companies are in competition, which will be essential in the long term like the dominant 
firm.   
We modelize a technological shock with uncertainty. We assume that this technological 
shock appears in the shape of new firms but of which a part only will be productive.     3 
Uncertainty relates to the identification of the viable firms.  This uncertainty decreases with 
the time and the diffusion of fundamentalist information that makes it possible to identify 
without error the viable firms.  In the absence of this fundamentalist information, the behavior 
of the agents follows a rule of decision similar to that formulated by Heiner (1983).  The 
evolution of agents’ confidence with regard to their own competences is then determined by 
the dynamic of prices noted on the market.  Each agent uses the information contained in the 
contract price of the new firms by supposing that the other agents are better informed.  The 
initial rise of the stock market that results from the technological shock is then self-sustained 
by the agents which see there information concerning the viability of the new firms that they 
have.  The technological shock and the problem of coordination that is established between 
the agents leads to the emergence of a bubble.  This bubble bursts only with the time and the 
progressive diffusion of fundamentalist information.  This model makes it possible to explain 
a stock market bubble while at the same time the agents have a perfect knowledge of the 
impact of the technological shock on the economy and the date on which this shock occurs.  
The uncertainty relates only to the identification of the viable firms that emerges of this 
shock.   
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The economy is described in section 2.  We 
present in section 3, the technological shock and the model of rationality followed by the 
agents.  In section 4, we study the dynamic of the prices and section 5 presents results of 
simulations.  We study in section 6, the consequences of the technological shock on the 
aggregate market, in particular when it involves the obsolescence of the old firms. Section 7 
concludes.   
 
 
2.  Description of the economy 
 
The model is based on the Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) technological model that is a 
version of the Lucas trees model (1978). This is a production economy with a single final 
good, y, fruit juice, and two intermediate goods, x and z, apples and oranges. There is no 
storage and the fruit juice production is exactly equal to its consumption. This economy is 
populated by many infinitely identical agents. Preferences are 
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where yt are gallons of juice produced and consumed at date t,  β  is the actualization rate, 
U(·) is the Utility Function and E[·], the esperance operator. 
Competitive firms make juice using apples, x, oranges, z, and a third factor, n, as inputs in 
a constant-returns-to-scale production function for final goods: 
 
(2) ( , , ) yF x z n = . 
 
Let px and pz denote prices of fruits. The factor n is fixed; its supply is normalized to 
equal 1. The production function is rewritten: 
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The cost shares of the three factors s ,  z and n are respectively sx,  sz and sn, where 
() 1 xzn sss ++ =  since returns are constant. Factor payments equal output and firms make zero 
profits. Optimal input choice means that prices of x and z must equal their marginal products: 
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The proceeds from the sales of apples and oranges are paid out as dividends. The prices of the 
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Initially, there are no orange trees. The economy comprises a unit measure of apple trees, 
each yielding x apples. Output and consumption are: 
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This state of affairs is expected to remain there indefinitely. Market capitalization at the 
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3. Technological change and uncertainty 
 
A unit measure of new trees – orange trees –  spring forth at date T0 without any fruit. 
News arrives at date T1 that a share of this unit measure of orange trees will yield z oranges 
per period and per tree at the date T2. However, agents are not likely to distinguish viable trees 
between unproductive trees before the date T2. Agents knows all the same at date T1 that the 
arrival of orange trees permanently raises the output of juice at date T2 to: 
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  The uncertainty is caused from the difficulty for agents to distinguish productive orange 
trees between all orange trees. Agents faced with this uncertainty follows a behavior 
rationality suggested by Heiner (1983). Ronal Heiner has proposed a theory of predictable 
behavior, which has its roots in a competence-difficulty gap (called a C-D gap). This gap is a 
measure of the spread between an economic agent’s competence to make an optimizing 
decision,  c, and the complexity of the environment, e. The structure of uncertainty is 
represented by : 
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Heiner argues that as the C-D gap widens, the agent is increasingly likely to follow a 
rule-governed behavior, which produces observed regularities in economic behavior. 
According to Heiner, we will apply the C-D gap theory to explain “switching between buying 
and selling strategies in financial markets, resulting in sudden movement in stock prices”
1. 
Therefore, an agent will buy whenever the expected gain from buying exceeds the 
expected loss. Let π  denote the share of viable orange trees and (1 ) π −  the share of 
unproductive orange trees. The probability that an agent will buy an orange tree when the 
orange tree is viable, is represented by r with consequent gain g. Similarly, the conditional 
probability of an agent buying an orange tree when the orange tree is unproductive, is 
represented by w with consequent loss l .  
An agent will buy an orange tree whenever the gains from buying a viable tree will 
cumulate faster than the losses from buying an unproductive tree, that is 
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  Heiner (1983) define this expression as the Reliability Condition. The left-hand side of 
the inequality is a reliability ratio, which measures the probability of correctly responding 
under the right circumstances relative to the probability of mistakenly responding under the 
wrong circumstances. The right-hand side of the inequality represents a tolerance limit, which 
a reliability ratio must satisfy. 
Let  t ψ  denote the reliability ratio at the date t. This ratio represents agents confidence 
degree towards their own competency. The reliability ratio assesses the subjective probability 
to recognize a viable tree relative to the subjective probability not to recognize an 
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where α is the likelihood degree that agents accord to the information contained in the market 
price. We introduce a “herd behavior” in the reliability ratio since agents refer to market 
prices thinking that other agents hold more information.  
The gain received by an agent who has bought a viable tree and the loss sustained by one 




















where  , zt P  is the market price of orange trees at the date t and  , zt P  is the fundamental value of 
orange trees at the date t. The value of unproductive trees is supposed null. Consequently, the 
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The price equation is composed of two expressions. The first represents the determination 
of the price under uncertainty according to Heiner’s model (1983) in equation 12. However, 
this expression is slightly different of the Heiner’s seminal model in order to be continuous 
for a market price determination. The larger inequality between the reliability ratio and 
tolerance limit is, the more confident towards their own competency the agents are. Then, 
they will be able to pay to receive stream of future dividends. This expression plays fully 
when uncertainty is maximal that is no information is available apart from market price. 
The second expression represents a “fundamentalist reverting” who appears in the orange 
tree pricing with the uncertainty reduction and the arrival of fundamentalist information. This 
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where  t η  represents the degree of fundamentalist information that agents possess. The 










   with   [] 0 and 0,1 b γ >∈ , 
 
where b is a parameter of Y-axis and 
1
γ
 is the rate of diffusion of fundamentalist information, 
i.e. the rate of uncertainty reduction. 
  Uncertainty is fully when η= 0; no fundamentalist information is available. The 
environment is certain when η= 1; agents are able to distinguish viable tree with the 
information from the environment and their competence. The rate of uncertainty reduction is 
determined by the uncertainty structure of the technological shock: 
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The function  t η  with different values of γ  appears in figure 1. Then, the more limited 
agents competence is and the more complex environment is, the longer time uncertainty 
reduction will take. 
 
 
4. Dynamic of price   
 





















Market valuation is equal to the fundamental value when B = 1. This state corresponds to 
the mechanism of pricing in a certain environment that is η=1. B < 1 correspond to an 
undervaluation of orange trees and B > 1 to an overvaluation. In the case of misvaluation, the   9 
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The reliability ratio is rewritten : 
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and appears under the guise of second order recurrent series:  11 (, ) nn n Uf U U +− = . Then, it is 
necessary to solve this equation system, to settle Uo and U1, that is the initial level of the 
reliability ratio. 
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When  1 1 tT ≤− , there is no available fundamentalist information (η=0) and π  is equal to 
0. 
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The valuation ratio, Bt, is equal to 0 for any n: 
   10 
















At date T1, there is a shock on π . Then, fundamentalist information appears depending 










depending on α, the likelihood degree that agents accord to the information contained in the 
market price. 
Fundamentalist information, η, at first periods is too small to exert a sufficient tension on 
price formation. Market price of orange trees increases and each agent interpret this 
movement as information over the viability of each tree. Then, each agent thinks that his own 
competence allows him to identify correctly viable trees. In the case there is no 
“fundamentalist reverting” (η=0),  t ψ  follows a “myopic disaster” dynamic where confidence 
agents is fully determined by movement of market price at the precedent period. The reversal 
appears when objective and fundamentalist information is taller than weight that agents 
accord to the information contained in the market price. 
 At  date  T2, whatever uncertainty degree there is at the date (T2-1), payment of dividends 
by viable trees leads to eliminate uncertainty and the environment becomes certain. There is 





Parameters are followers: γ = 0.4; β = 0.96; α = 0.15; 
i t ψ = 1; 
i t π = 0; 
1 T π = 1/3; b = 
1000; T0 = -12, T1 = 0 and T2 = 30. 
Figure 2 and figure 3 show reliability ratio and valuation ratio depending on inverse of 
the rate of uncertainty reduction. This parameter plays on time extinction of the bubble. The 
faster fundamentalist information is delivered, the earlier bubble will disappear. 
Figure 4 shows the special case of technological shock in certain environment ( 1 t t η =∀), 
where the shock on share of viable orange trees is accompanied by all information permitting 
agents to distinguish viable trees.   11 
Figure 5 and figure 6 show reliability ratio and valuation ratio depending on different 
values of weight that agents accord to the information contained in the market price (α ). This 
parameter has an influence on the size of the bubble. For high values of α , the bubble is taller 





Initially, we shall normalize 
i t ψ  to 1 since we suppose that an agent without information 
is characterized by the probability to recognize a viable tree equal to the probability to not 
recognize an unproductive tree (rw = ). But many authors demonstrate than “overconfidence” 
seems to be a characteristic of personal judgment (DeBondt and Thaler, 1995)
2. Then, we 
have simulated the dynamic of price with different values of the initial reliability ratio (
i t ψ ). 
Figure 7 shows this simulation. The initial level of reliability ratio appears as a determinant of 
the bubble size. 
Figure 8 shows the special case where payment of dividends comes before the complete 
reduction of uncertainty (T2 < t as  1 t η = ). The adjustment of orange trees price is immediate 
because the payment of first dividends at the date T2 permits agents to immediately recognize 
viable trees. The collapse of the bubble is instant. 
 
 
6. Aggregate market and  « destructive creation » 
 
When news arrive at date T1 that a share of orange trees will yield z oranges per period at 
date T2, Px,t falls since dividends beyond date T2-1 are now discounted at a higher rate, i.e. 
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2 See Odean (1998) for a survey litterature on « overconfidence ».   12 
The orange bubble influences the aggregate market capitalization depending on the future 
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  When the arrival of oranges produces obsolescence of apples, then information that 
appears at date T1 could lead to decrease Px,t. If we suppose that the two fruits are substitutes 
in the production of juice, this would decrease the share of apples in the production function 
as  
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The impact of the news at date T1 would be 
21 (1 )
TT β
− − , which would represent a 30% 
drop in the case of precedent parameters.  
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Figure 9 shows the dynamic of fruit trees price in the case of fully obsolescence. When 
the news arrives at date T1, agents anticipate the future obsolescence of apples from date T2, 
and then the value of apple trees decreases. The orange trees bubble compensates more than 
this drop. When orange trees are correctly valued (B=1), the ratio market capitalization to 












In our model, the size of the bubble depends on i) the initial level of the confidence 
degree that agents allot to their own competence, (ii) the weight that agents accord to the 
information contained in the market price.  The rapidity of the bubble deflation is determined 
by the rate of diffusion of fundamentalist information, i.e. the rate of reduction of the gap 
between the complexity of the environment and the cognitive capacities of the agents. 
The uncertainty concerning the identification of viable firms which emerge of the 
technological shock, leads to the emergence of a stock market bubble even though agents 
have a perfect knowledge of the impact of the shock and date on which it occurs.  This type of 
uncertainty seems to characterize the firms of the ICT industries, which are confronted with a 
“winners take all” competition.   
In this model, uncertainty and incomplete information are determining factors in the 
emergence of the bubble. Mimetic behavior is rational to agents who follow other 
participants, who are thought to be better informed. This model suggest that strengthening 
transparency and expand competencies required by the analysis of complex information are 
likely to reduce the size and the duration of the bubble. Also, the long time of the bursting   14 
ICT bubble (see table 2) suggests than the reduction of uncertainty about identification of 
viable firms took time. Finally, the absence of reaction from the Fed board members since the 
“irrational exuberance” speech in 1996 is likely to increase the weight that agents accord to 
the information contained in the market price. Therefore increasing margin requirements
3 a 















                                                 
3 See discussion about marginal calls by Robert Shiller in the The Wall Street Journal (Monday, April 10, 2000). 
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Tableau 1 
Historical comparison of stock market crashes 








































Nasdaq -36.5%  -61%  -67.5% 
US 
Isdex -43% -80% -85% 
Nouveau 
Marché  -49% -68%  -79.7% 
France 
ITCAC -37%  -53% -63.7% 
Deutschland Neuer  Market  -26.7%  -35%  -48.8% 










crash size  period  duration  index   
October 
1929  -37%  october 11 – 
november 10  30 days  Dow Jones 
Industrial 
October 
1987  -30%  october 2 – 
october19  17 days  Dow Jones 
Industrial 
-36,5%  march 10 – 
may 25  45 days 






april 4, 2001 
7 months 
Nasdaq   17 
Figure 1 
Process of fundamentalist information diffusion (η) 
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Figure 3 























Valuation ratio (B) 
and process of fundamentalist information diffusion (η)  
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Figure 5 
Reliability ratio (ψ ) depending on the weight that agents accord to the information contained 
























Valuation ratio (B) depending on the weight that agents accord to the information contained in 
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Figure 7 
Valuation ratio (B) 























Valuation ratio (B)  
when payment of dividends comes before the complete reduction of uncertainty 
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Figure 9 
Market capitalization in the case of fully apples obsolescence  
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